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This paper studies the role of worker learning in a labor market where workers
have incomplete information about the quality of their employment match. The
amount of information about the quality of a new match depends on a worker’s
past job experience. Allowing workers to learn from experience generates a de-
cline in job finding probabilities with age that is consistent with patterns found in
the data. Moreover, workers with more past experience will on average have less
wage volatility on new jobs, which is also consistent with the data. In contrast to
the fact that the cross-sectional wage distribution fans out with experience, this
second result implies that individual wage changes become more predictable.
Keywords. Learning, experience, wage volatility, worker flows, job finding prob-
ability.
JEL classification. E24, J24, J31, J64.
1. Introduction
This paper modifies the classic Jovanovic (1984) random matching model with worker
learning to allow past work experience to give unemployed workers more information
about the quality of a new match before choosing to accept or reject a job. Specifically,
when an unemployed worker matches with a firm, the amount of information about the
match depends on her past work experience. Thus, experience allows workers to better
distinguish between good and bad job offers. This simple mechanism generates new
and empirically relevant predictions about job finding probabilities over the life cycle
while maintaining the rich set of implications from previous models of worker learning.
Moreover, the model predicts that wage volatility on new jobs decreases with past work
experience when job finding probabilities decline. This prediction is then found to be
consistent with life cycle wage patterns in data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Without worker learning from past experience, the model cannot
account for declines in job finding probabilities or wage volatility over the life cycle.
In contrast to the literature that emphasizes employer learning, this paper focuses
on worker learning by studying the role of experience in providing information about
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the quality of new job matches. Existing models with worker learning emphasize the
role of workers sorting themselves into better jobs and generate accurate predictions
about unemployment, job separation probabilities, and wages over the life cycle. Al-
lowing experience to provide more information about the quality of a new match also
generates declining job finding probabilities with experience and implies that individ-
ual wage volatility on a new job decreases with experience. While models of employer
learning can explain cross-sectional inequality over the life cycle, the novel prediction
from the new model with worker learning implies that wage volatility for a worker on a
new job decreases with experience. This reduction in wage volatilities has implications
for the income risk that individuals face despite growing cross-sectional inequality.1
Implications of the model are assessed numerically. First, the model is parameter-
ized to match estimates of the average duration of first jobs, the fraction of new jobs
that involve job-to-job transitions, the age profile of job finding probabilities, and the
magnitude of individual wage changes. This calibration implies that the precision of the
signal that the worker receives from past experience is nearly 10% as strong as if she
had been working at that job for her entire career. That is, for a worker with 10 years
of past job experience she would receive nearly a year’s worth of information about the
quality of her match about a prospective new job. Next, the implications of the novel
feature of the model are assessed. The model with experience generates declining job
finding probabilities with experience that are consistent with the decline in U.S. data.
The model can even generate empirically relevant declines in job finding probabilities
even when experience only provides small amounts of information about the quality of
a new match. Moreover, the model predicts that when job finding probabilities are de-
creasing, the volatility of wages that a worker faces on a new job will also decline with ex-
perience. Wage volatility is measured as the unanticipated component of wage changes
during the first year on a job. When workers have more information about a new match
before accepting the job, the unanticipated wage changes are smaller because workers
are more certain of the quality of the match before accepting a job.
To provide evidence of the importance of the experience mechanism, predictions
from the model about the volatility of wages with experience are shown to be consis-
tent with NLSY79 data. A fixed effects specification confirms individual level reductions
in wage volatility with work experience both in data simulated from the model and in
NLSY79 data. Labor market experience is associated with a large decrease in within-job
wage volatility that can be an important source of income risk facing workers. It is inter-
esting to contrast this finding with the well known fact that the variance of wage distri-
butions increases with worker experience.2 The new finding that more past experience
reduces the volatility of wages on individual jobs implies that while unexplained fac-
1Most recently Kahn and Lange (2013) study how much of the unexplained increase in the variance of
residual wages with age can be accounted for by employer learning. Other studies on the role of employer
learning include Lange (2007), who studies the speed of learning, and Kahn (2013), who studies the degree
of asymmetry in information between different employers.
2The empirical regularity that the cross-sectional variation in wages increases with age or experience
holds both for raw data and when measured as the residual of estimated wages. For a summary of the liter-
ature, see Neal and Rosen (2000). Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) summarize the known facts about life cycle
wage variation. Kahn and Lange (2013) estimate the role of employer learning and the growth in worker
human capital as potential explanations of this phenomenon.
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tors increase the dispersion of wages across the population, individuals have increasing
certainty about how their own wages will evolve while working on a particular job.
An empirical literature that examines the role of experience in the evolution of wages
relates to the findings in this paper. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and
Altonji and Williams (2005) examine the extent to which wages rise with tenure in a
given job rather than through experience. Learning in this paper has both a firm spe-
cific and a general effect. While experience provides individuals with information about
the quality of future matches, workers learn about the quality of their current job at a
faster rate. A recent line of research studies the degree to which skills are transferrable
across jobs. While Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) found that human capital is occu-
pation specific, recent work by Poletaev and Robinson (2008) and Gathmann and Schön-
berg (2010) implies that human capital formation is task based. McCall (1990) explores
whether human capital is job or occupation specific in a search model. While this paper
does not study occupational choice, it can explain McCall’s (1990) finding that longer
tenure in the first job implies lower hazard rates in future employment as experience
allows workers to reject poor second matches.
This paper also contributes to a literature that uses learning models to explain la-
bor market outcomes. Jovanovic (1979) explains broad features of worker turnover be-
havior: hump-shaped hazards of separation from a job by tenure and declining sep-
aration probabilities with age. Recent models use learning to understand the persis-
tence of unemployment rates, wage dispersion, wage growth, and occupational mobility
(see, for example, Pries (2004), Moscarini (2005), Farber and Gibbons (1996), Gibbons,
Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005), Gorry, Devon, and Trachter (2014), and Papageorgiou
(2014)). While previous learning models explain worker behavior when employed, they
have little to say about worker behavior while unemployed. The major exception to this
gap in the literature is the work by Gonzalez and Shi (2010). In their model, workers
learn from search outcomes while unemployed rather than by observing outcomes dur-
ing employment. While their model predicts lower wages upon employment for workers
with longer unemployment durations, they do not generate different durations of unem-
ployment by age.
By assessing a mechanism that explains why employment outcomes vary by age,
this paper contributes to a growing literature that uses life cycle models to understand
employment outcomes including Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2011), Esteban-Pretel
and Fujimoto (2014), Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2012), Yedid-Levi, Jaimovic, Siu,
and Gervais (2015), and Gorry (2013). These papers seek to explain the patterns of labor
market outcomes over the life cycle and evaluate the effect of labor market policies such
as unemployment insurance and minimum wages. Most closely related to this paper,
Esteban-Pretel and Fujimoto (2014) introduce age dependent information revelation in
a general equilibrium life cycle model to generate a decline in job finding probabili-
ties. The learning mechanism in this paper where experience provides new information
adds an additional component to life cycle human capital investment. Such a motive
enhances the simple information mechanism because workers have a greater incentive
to become and remain employed early in their careers. This paper also contributes to
the literature by providing empirical evidence for this mechanism.
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Finally, this paper contributes to a literature that seeks to explain the decline in em-
ployment transitions as workers age. In matching models like Jovanovic (1979) all infor-
mation is job specific and unemployment durations do not change over the life cycle.
More generally, models with job specific human capital and firm productivity shocks
successfully explain a decline in job separation probabilities, but job specific human
capital has no implication for job finding probabilities. In contrast, sorting models such
as Gibbons et al. (2005) take learning to be about a worker’s ability. In these models, a
worker’s performance on one job generates an equivalent amount of knowledge about
her performance on all other jobs. These models also have no prediction about job
finding probabilities as workers direct their search to their most profitable job. Other
common explanations for the decline in turnover focus specifically on job separations.
For instance, Neal (1999) presents a model in which workers search for both a career
and a job specific match. The empirical implications of career and job matches for job
turnover are explored in Pavan (2010). The life cycle patterns of job finding and separa-
tion probabilities must be explored together, because job finding probabilities can have
a direct effect on equilibrium job separation probabilities that depend on the worker’s
value of unemployment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
how the parameters of the model are chosen. Section 4 presents the results from the
calibrated model concerning job finding and separation probabilities, unemployment,
and wage growth. Section 5 shows that the model’s predictions about wage volatility are
consistent with data from the NLSY79. Section 6 concludes. Technical data are available
in a supplementary file on the journal website, http://qeconomics.org/supp/363/code_
and_data.zip.
2. A learning model with experience and job-to-job transitions
This section describes the economic environment of an individual making optimal de-
cisions when faced with uncertain job opportunities. The worker has incomplete infor-
mation about the quality of any particular job match.3 When engaged in production she
learns about the quality of her match, and when searching for a new job she is randomly
matched to employment opportunities and gets an initial signal about the quality of
any prospective match. The novel feature of the model is that the precision of the signal
about prospective matches depends on her past job experience.
2.1 Preferences and production
The infinitely lived worker has preferences given by
∞∑
t=0
βtct 
3While the focus of this paper is on the worker’s decisions as a result of learning, in the setup of the
problem workers and firms have common knowledge about the quality of the match. For simplicity the
exposition will focus on the worker’s decision about which jobs to accept following Jovanovic (1984). More-
over, this paper does not take a stance on whether information from experience is generated by the worker
or the firm as long as it is common knowledge.
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There is no storage technology. The worker makes two decisions. When employed,
she decides between quitting to search for a new opportunity and continuing to pro-
duce. When unemployed, she chooses to accept or reject prospective matches.
Production occurs when a worker is matched with a job. In each period, a match of
type μ produces output
xt = μ+ zt
where zt ∼ N(0σ2) is independently and identically distributed noise on the output
process. Therefore, xt ∼N(μσ2).
As in Moscarini (2005), the economy is composed of two types of jobs: μ ∈ {μhμl}.
Let μh > μl so that μh denotes the productivity of a good opportunity and μl denotes the
productivity of a bad one. All jobs are drawn independently from the same distribution
where a fraction p0 of them are of type μh.
2.2 Learning
The worker is uncertain about the quality of her match and she learns about it in two
ways. First, while employed, she observes her output and updates her beliefs about the
quality of the match. Second, before accepting a job offer, she receives a signal about the
quality of a prospective match that depends on her experience.
While employed, workers observe the output they produce in each period and up-
date their beliefs. Given the normality of output noise, for any current belief, p, the ex-
pected density of output is given by
ψ(x|p)= p 1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(
x−μh
σ
)2)
+ (1−p) 1
σ
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(
x−μl
σ
)2)

This is the density of a mixture distribution where with probability p output is drawn
from a normal distribution with mean μh and variance σ , and with probability 1− p it
is drawn from a normal with mean μl and the same variance.
Using this known distribution of output, the worker observers her output and uses it
to update her belief about the probability that she has a good match. Given any current
belief, p, and observed output for a given period, x, the updated belief, p′, is formed
using Bayes’ rule as follows:
f (px) ≡ p′
= Prob(μ= μh|px)
=
pexp
(
−1
2
(
x−μh
σ
)2)
pexp
(
−1
2
(
x−μh
σ
)2)
+ (1−p)exp
(
−1
2
(
x−μl
σ
)2) 
In the above expression, the numerator is proportional to the joint probability of ob-
serving output x and the match being good, while the denominator is proportional to
the total probability of observing output x.
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With this updating function, define the inverse function f−1(p′|p) to be the output,
x, required to have posterior p′ given prior p. This function is given by
f−1
(
p′|p)= σ2
μh −μl ln
(
p′(1−p)(
1−p′)p
)
+ μh +μl
2

Finally, the distribution G(p′|p) can be defined as the distribution of updated beliefs af-
ter observing one period of output given a current belief p. Then the probability density
function (p.d.f.) of the G distribution, g, is given by
g
(
p′|p) = ψ(f−1(p′|p)|p)∣∣∣∣df
−1(p′|p)
dp′
∣∣∣∣
= ψ(f−1(p′|p)|p)( σ2
p′
(
1−p′)(μh −μl)
)

When meeting a new match the worker gets a signal about its quality that depends
on her past experience. It is assumed that she receives a signal equivalent to observing
ατ observations from the output process. The variable τ is months of past work experi-
ence and α > 0 determines how much information a unit of experience provides about
the quality of a new match relative to month of tenure on a given job. The worker’s ini-
tial belief about the quality of a match when she has no previous experience is p0. The
normality assumption makes noninteger amounts of information well defined. More-
over, normality implies that to update beliefs after viewing n ∈R observations the worker
only needs to know her prior belief, p, the average value of the observations, x¯, and the
number of observations observed, t. The entire list of observations x1x2     xt is not
needed. For a worker who observes n periods of output, the distribution of the average
output per period, x¯, is given by
ψ˜(x¯;pn) = p 1σ√
n
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(
x¯−μh
σ√
n
)2)
+ (1−p) 1σ√
n
√
2π
exp
(
−1
2
(
x¯−μl
σ√
n
)2)

This is again the mixture distribution of drawing output from good and bad jobs for n
periods weighted by the current belief, p.
Using the same updating strategy, the posterior after observing the output from n
periods is computed as
f˜ (p x¯ n)=
pexp
(
−1
2
(
x¯−μh
σ√
n
)2)
pexp
(
−1
2
(
x¯−μh
σ√
n
)2)
+ (1−p)exp
(
−1
2
(
x¯−μl
σ√
n
)2) 
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Inverting f˜ gives the value of x¯ needed to generate posterior p′: f˜−1(p′p t) = x¯.
Define H(p′|τ) as the distribution of initial beliefs from a new production opportunity.
Hence the p.d.f. of the H distribution, h, is given by
h
(
p′|τ)= ψ˜(f˜−1(p′p0ατ);p0ατ)
(
σ2
p′
(
1−p′)(μh −μl)
)

where α and p0 are parameters. Note that for any new match the prior belief is the un-
conditional probability that the match is good, p0, and the worker updates her belief
with ατ observations from the distribution of output.4
2.3 Wages
As in Jovanovic (1979, 1984), when firms have zero cost of entry, any wage process that
pays the worker her expected output is an equilibrium. For this to be the case, the as-
sumption that firms and workers are randomly matched is important so that workers of
different levels of experience are matched with the same jobs. In such a pooling equilib-
rium, firms and workers are randomly matched together and then employers separate
workers using available information to set wages in each period. This equilibrium does
not uniquely determine the wage process as long as workers get all of the rents from the
match. In this paper, it is assumed that the worker is paid her expected marginal product
on the job. In particular, it is assumed that the worker’s wage is given by
w(p)= pμh + (1−p)μl
Under this assumption, firms make zero expected profits and any matching rate, λ, be-
tween workers and production opportunities can be sustained as an equilibrium out-
come.5 While the wage process is not unique, the worker’s matching processes with
firms is.6
4The process of on the job learning can be generalized beyond the specified output process to be arbi-
trary distributions G and H. The distribution G must depend on the value of the current belief, p, so the
distribution of updated beliefs, p′, is given by G(p′|p). For a general learning process, two restrictions are
made on G. First, G is nondegenerate so that the signal conveys some information about p. Second, G is
restricted so that p is a martingale. This is a natural restriction since G is used to update an individual’s
current beliefs.
The distribution H(p′|τ) can be generalized beyond the specific normality assumptions described
above. In general, for H to provide more information about jobs it must be weakly increasing in τ in terms
of second order stochastic dominance. This means that for τ1 > τ2,∫ x
0
H
(
p′|τ1
)−H(p′|τ2)dp′ ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [01]
For higher values of τ workers get more initial information about the quality of a job. This increasing in-
formation for experienced unemployed workers is the novel feature of the model. A sufficient condition for
second order stochastic dominance is that if τ1 > τ2, then H(p′|τ1) is a mean preserving spread of H(p′|τ2).
5One potential issue with this setup is that such a wage process is not self-enforcing as the firm will want
to lower the worker’s wage after a match. As discussed in Jovanovic (1984), this problem can be overcome
either through accounting for the firm’s reputation or assuming that there are enforceable contracts.
6While this simple equilibrium is used to analyze the model, it is also possible to enrich the model into
a standard search and matching framework by allowing firms to post vacancies. In that case, the model
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2.4 Value functions
This section defines the value functions for the worker’s problem. When employed, the
worker consumes her wage, ct = w(p), that depends on the expected probability that
her job is good. Workers separate from their current job for three reasons. First, in each
period, with probability s > 0 employed workers are exogenously separated from their
jobs. The variable s captures reasons for job separations that are not captured by the
endogenous quits that arise from learning. Possible examples include plant closures or
geographic relocation by the worker. Second, they could receive an unfavorable signal
about the job quality and decide to quit. Finally, when remaining employed they receive
an outside job offer with probability δ. If their outside offer is better than their current
job, they will quit and transition directly to the new job.
In the discrete time model, the timing of events must be specified, but alternate tim-
ing assumptions have little effect on the overall results. The following timing of events
for employed workers is used. First, the worker finds out if she receives an exogenous
separation shock. If still employed, she updates her belief about the quality of her cur-
rent match based on output produced in the current period using G(dp′|p) and decides
if she will quit to unemployment or remain employed. If she remains employed, she re-
ceives an outside job offer with probability δ. The outside offer is of type μh with prob-
ability p0. Based on her current experience τ, the worker updates her belief about the
quality of the outside offer. Her posterior belief is given by H(q|τ) and she changes jobs
if her belief about the quality of the new job is higher than her updated belief about the
quality of her current job.
Let V (pτ) be the value function for an employed worker with belief p and experi-
ence τ. The value function is written as
V (pτ) = w(p)+βsU(τ + 1)
+β(1− s)
∫ 1
0
max
{
U(τ + 1) (1− δ)V (p′ τ + 1) (1)
+ δ
∫ 1
0
max
{
V
(
p′ τ + 1) V (qτ + 1)}H(dq|τ)}G(dp′|p)
A worker with belief p and experience τ gets her expected output, w(p). She dis-
counts the future at rate β. In the next period, she is separated from her job with prob-
ability s, becoming unemployed with experience τ + 1. With probability 1− s she is not
separated from her job and receives her updated belief from the distribution G. De-
pending on the realization of her updated belief she can choose to remain employed
would include a parameter for the flow cost of posting a vacancy that could be calibrated to generate a given
match rate λ. The key assumption for such an equilibrium is that matching between firms and workers is
random so that workers of different experience levels cannot be separated ex ante. This means that the job
search process is a pooling equilibrium where all workers are competing for the same jobs. After matching,
firms pay wages based on the firm’s and worker’s shared beliefs about the worker’s expected output. This
ex post separation is necessary for the model to generate predictions about how wages vary with worker
experience. Alternately separating equilibria, where directed search allows firms to separate workers before
matching, are possible and would likely have different implications. However, such analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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with belief p′ and experience τ+1 or quit to become unemployed with experience τ+1.
If she remains employed she gets a job offer with probability δ and decides to stay or
transfer depending on the quality of the new offer. With on the job search, higher values
of δ give the worker a greater chance of meeting a new firm while employed, and hence
lower the worker’s propensity to separate from her job to unemployment. Moreover, be-
cause workers get all of the surplus in this environment, no special assumptions need to
be made about the wage bargain at the point that the worker gets an outside offer. She
simply chooses the job that she believes is the best and is paid her expected output. The
model with job-to-job search is parameterized along with the baseline model in the next
section.
Unemployed workers consume unemployment benefits, ct = b. When unemployed,
the worker matches with a firm with probability λ. The job is of type μh with probability
p0 and the worker updates her belief about the quality of the match based on her expe-
rience τ before choosing to accept the offer. The posterior distribution of beliefs about
the quality of the match is given by H(p′|τ). She must choose between remaining un-
employed and becoming employed with belief p′. If she does not receive a job offer she
remains unemployed with the same experience.
Let U(τ) be the value function for an unemployed worker with experience τ. The
value function is given by
U(τ)= b+β(1− λ)U(τ)+βλ
∫ 1
0
max
{
U(τ)V
(
p′ τ
)}
H
(
dp′|τ) (2)
Finally, it is assumed that the maximum experience that can be accumulated by a
worker is T . While the infinite horizon model would in principle allow a worker to ac-
cumulated more experience, including a finite maximum experience attained simpli-
fies the computation of the model.7 It can be justified on two separate grounds. First,
T can be chosen to be large enough so that workers already have nearly perfect infor-
mation about new production opportunities after T periods of past experience. Second,
the finite nature of individual working lives means that workers only accumulate a fi-
nite amount of experience before retirement. The assumption implies that the marginal
value of additional periods of experience is 0 once a worker reaches T .
2.5 Model characterization
The general learning framework described above embeds the learning models of
Jovanovic (1984) and Gibbons et al. (2005) into a matching framework so the impli-
cations for worker flows and wage volatility can be explored. When α = 0 there is no
learning across jobs and the model is identical to that of Jovanovic (1984), where work-
ers search and get an initial signal about the quality of a match. In the case of α = 1,
7An alternate assumption would be to use a finite horizon model. The finite horizon model expands the
state space, as the worker’s age becomes an additional state variable. Solving and simulating a finite horizon
version of the model with the same parameters generates results that are nearly identical beyond minor
changes in the last few years before retirement. Since the novel implications of learning are concentrated
at the beginning of the workers career and important factors determining labor supply around retirement
are not modeled, the paper uses the more streamlined infinite horizon model.
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a worker gets a signal about the quality of an initial opportunity of equal strength to
her entire past job experience. This case is similar to the model of Gibbons et al. (2005)
where workers learn about their productivity in all jobs. The case of α = 1 is still differ-
ent from Gibbons et al. (2005) as in their model workers direct their search to the most
productive job, so experience does not interact with job finding probabilities. Allowing
experience to influence worker’s information about the quality of new matches gener-
ates a theory of how job finding probabilities evolve over the life cycle. Different choices
of α parameterize how much information transfers from one job to another.
The solution consists of a reservation belief about the quality of the match that de-
pends on experience, p¯(τ), such that workers will accept job offers or continue working
as long as p ≥ p¯(τ) and reject offers or quit otherwise. The reservation belief is solved
for by setting the value function of a matched worker with the reservation productiv-
ity equal to the value of an unmatched worker for each level of experience; that is, p¯(τ)
solves
V
(
p¯(τ) τ
)=U(τ) (3)
To make precise predictions about how additional experience influences the job
finding probability and wage volatility of a worker, it is first important to know how addi-
tional experience influences the reservation value p¯(τ). Unfortunately, it is not possible
to characterize how p¯(τ) changes with experience in terms of model primitives. The
challenge in finding such a characterization is related to the result of Radner and Stiglitz
(1984) about the nonconcavity of the value of information. In general, small amounts
of information may not be enough to change individual decisions and hence have lit-
tle value. Chade and Schlee (2002) emphasize the open question involved in generating
global concavity. In this particular environment, to see why p¯(τ) might be decreasing
in τ consider an example where a worker gets no extra information about the quality of
jobs until she gains τ¯ units of experience and then once she gets τ¯ units of experience
the quality of any new match is perfectly revealed. Then the only value of experience
before τ¯ is that it moves her closer to the threshold. Therefore, there will be a space of
experience just before τ¯ that the worker will be willing to accept worse and worse op-
portunities just to get the payoff from getting τ¯ units of experience. In this case, the
option value of experience outweighs the current value to the worker and can generate
decreasing reservation values. The general model is rich enough to allow for different re-
lationships between experience, the reservation belief, the job finding rate, and wages.
The implications of the model are explored quantitatively in the next sections. See the
Appendix for a discussion of what can be shown by making assumptions about the value
of information in a simple learning model with no job-to-job transitions.
While the remainder of the paper will quantitatively explore the implications of the
model, we can still understand the model better by discussing a few special cases. First,
consider a model where the precision of the worker’s signal about the quality of a new
job is independent of her experience, as in Jovanovic (1984). In this case, job finding
probabilities will remain constant over the life cycle. However, we can also characterize
how the precision of the signal influences the worker’s probability of accepting any given
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job. As the precision of the signal increases, she will generally become pickier about
which jobs she is willing to accept. To see this consider two cases: one where she re-
ceives no information about the quality of new jobs and a second where she receives
perfect information. In the no information case, jobs are pure experience goods, so she
will accept any job offer from unemployment so as to learn about its quality. However,
in the second case she will only accept good jobs as they are inspection goods, lower-
ing her job finding rate. In the current paper, work experience provides workers with a
more precise signal about the quality of a prospective job. This modifies the problem
by adding additional option value to remaining employed, so workers would lower their
reservation belief p¯(τ) relative to a model where experience had no value. Therefore, for
job finding probabilities to decline over the life cycle the information effect of rejecting
bad jobs has to outweigh changes in the option value. This will often be true if the option
value declines as individuals have more information.
Finally, the mechanism described above that generates a decline in job finding prob-
abilities with age also generates a decline in wage volatility on a new job. This result oc-
curs as long as individuals becoming pickier about new jobs corresponds with a more
precise signal about the quality of their new match. When they have a more precise
signal about their new job it means that additional information that they gain while
working on that job will imply smaller changes in their belief about the quality of the
match. Therefore, wages will change less for new information that they receive. Again,
this mechanism is more formally explored for a simple model in the Appendix. The re-
maining sections of the paper will quantitatively evaluate these mechanisms using sim-
ulations of the model.
3. Parameterization
This section parameterizes the model to match key features of the U.S. labor market. The
period length is 1 month. Eleven parameters must be chosen to compute the model: the
discount factor, β, the maximum experience, T , the expected output from a good match,
μh, the expected output from a bad match, μl, the probability that a match is good,
p0, the standard deviation of output noise, σ , the flow value of unemployment, b, the
exogenous separation probability, s, the job offer probability, λ, the job offer probability
when employed, δ, and the proportion of experience used for new matches, α.
First, a number of parameters are set directly either as a normalization or to match
values from the data. Because the model period is 1 month, β is set to 09966, which cor-
responds to an annual interest rate of 4%. The parameter T is set to 480, corresponding
to a maximum level of experience of 40 years. Increasing the maximum level of experi-
ence has no effect on the results. Finally, μh is normalized to 1 and μl is normalized to 0.
While this normalization does not change observed worker transitions in the model, the
size of μh relative to μl will determine how much wage growth the model generates.
The remaining parameters are calibrated together to match targets about worker’s
early career experiences. All remaining parameters are chosen simultaneously to min-
imize the sum of the square percent deviation between the chosen moments and mo-
ments simulated from the model. The remainder of this section will describe the param-
eters of the model along with the moments that they are most closely associated with.
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First, p0, the probability that any new job is good, is chosen to match data on the
average duration of first jobs from Farber (1994). Higher values of p0 mean that new jobs
are more likely to be good and hence workers stay in them for longer on average. Using
data from NLSY79, Farber finds that the average duration of jobs is 137 months. As this
sample focuses on young workers entering the labor market and the longest that a job
could last in his sample is 10 years, we target an average job duration of 137 months.
Before computing the mean, jobs with durations of longer than 10 years are dropped
from the simulation sample.
For any value of p0 the standard deviation of output noise, σ , and the flow value of
unemployment, b, are directly computed. In the model, given the normalization of μh
and μl, the evolution of p is fully determined by the signal to noise ratio:
μh−μl
σ . There-
fore, σ determines the evolution of beliefs. Hence, we target the standard deviation of
annual changes in log wages during workers’ first year on their first job. In particular,
using data from the NLSY79, for each job started with experience less than 1 year that
lasts longer than 1 year, the difference in log wages between the initial wage and first
year wage is computed. Then the standard deviation of this measure is taken across indi-
viduals. With 1668 first job observations, the standard deviation of first year log wages is
03555. Then σ is computed to match the standard deviation of wage changes for 100,000
workers who start new jobs with belief p0. Different values of σ are computed for each
value of p0 used in the calibration and b is set to be half the value of p0. This sets the
value of unemployment to be half of wages earned on a new job since p0 is the wage on
a new job where the worker has no past job experience. In this environment, b must be
high enough that if a worker knows for certain that a job is bad, it is optimal to quit, and
low enough that if the worker knows that the job is good that she will work. These as-
sumptions ensure that the worker’s search problem is nontrivial. This parameter deter-
mines the relative desirability of being employed in a bad job compared to searching for
a new job. Higher values of b make unemployment more attractive. The exogenous job
separation probability, s, is set to match the average job separation probability of 51–55
year old workers in the data.8 The average job separation probability for these workers
in the data is 0015. This moment is targeted for the fraction of separations directly to
unemployment in the model (not counting job-to-job transitions). The data show that
both job separation and job finding probabilities decline with age. Therefore, this is a
good target for exogenous separations in the model as older workers will not separate
for endogenous reasons late in life when they are sure about the quality of their match.
The parameter λ is the probability that an unemployed worker is matched with a
firm in each month. This value determines the maximum job finding probability for un-
employed workers if they accept any possible match. In the model, workers with no ex-
perience will accept all offers as their belief about any match is p0, which must be above
8In this paper, average monthly job finding and job separation probabilities are constructed from Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) monthly microdata between the years 1976 and 2005 using the same proce-
dure as Shimer (2012). The job finding probability is the monthly hazard of a worker moving from unem-
ployment to employment and the job separation probability is the hazard of an employed working moving
to unemployment in a three state model where workers can also be out of the labor force. These measures
correct for the possibility of multiple switches within a month. Finally, the time series of each measure is
averaged to generate average job finding and job separation probabilities by age.
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their reservation belief in any interesting parameterization else they would never be-
come employed. Hence, we target the job finding probability of 18–20 year old workers of
0403. Note that the entire profile of job finding rates is targeted in the parameterization,
λ is the highest job finding rate possible in the model and hence closely corresponds to
the highest job finding rates observed in the data.9
The parameter δ is the probability at which employed workers get an outside job
offer. Higher values of δ give the worker more frequent contact with outside jobs and
hence increase the likelihood of switching directly to a new job rather than having a
spell of unemployment. This is true both because they directly get more outside offers
and because the fact that they get offers while employed makes unemployment less at-
tractive. We target that 58% of new jobs are found without an unemployment spell as
Farber (1994) finds that this fraction of workers in the NLSY79 data switch directly to
new jobs.10
Finally, α determines by how much experience increases the amount of information
a worker receives about a potential new job. With α= 0 the model generates no decline
in job finding rates with age while values of α> 0 generate different rates of decline with
age. Hence, 5-year average job finding rates from the United States are used as targets
so that the model matches life cycle patterns of job finding rates from the data. Seven
5-year targets are used starting with the job finding probability of 21–25 year old work-
ers of 0364 and ending with the probability for 51–55 year old workers of 0270. Higher
values of α mean that past experience generates more information about prospective
jobs. Hence, one feature of the calibration is to provide an estimate of how much infor-
mation workers are able to transfer when assessing a new prospective match relative to
the amount that they learn while working on a particular job.
Table 1 summarizes the values of each of the parameters from this calibration. In
particular, α = 0098 implies that nearly 10% of the information learned on a given job
is transferred as new information about a prospective match. The next section assesses
the results of the simulated model relative to models where learning across jobs and
job-to-job transitions are shut down.
4. Simulated results
This section documents the implications of the calibrated model. When α > 0 past ex-
perience now has implications for worker’s job search behavior. Results from the cali-
brated model are compared to two counterfactual models where α= 0 and δ= 0. These
9In previous versions of the paper λ and s have been set to directly match the job finding probability of 18
year old workers and the job separation probability of 51–55 year old workers before simulating moments
of the model. The results from those calibrations were similar. Results are also robust to setting λ to higher
values and s to lower values than these direct targets.
10Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) also show that job-to-job transi-
tions are extremely important in the U.S. economy. The number of employed workers directly changing
employers each month is at least 26%, which is about twice as large as the percent of employed workers
who move into unemployment. Given the magnitude of these job-to-job flows, it is possible that they could
alter the selection of workers into jobs that drives the implications of the model. Hence, it is important to
include these transitions when assessing the implications of the model for worker flows and wage volatility.
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Table 1. Calibrated values of the model parameters for the baseline model and the model with
job-to-job transitions.
Parameter Value Target Moment Simulated Moment Target
β 09966 NA NA 4% interest rate
T 480 NA NA Max 40 years experience
μh 1 NA NA Normalization
μl 0 NA NA Normalization
p0 0647 137 1436 First job duration
σ 440 03555 03552 Standard deviation of wage changes
b 0319 NA NA Half of initial wage (p0)
s 0014 00154 0155 51–55 year old separation probability
λ 0392 0403 0397 18–20 year old finding probability
δ 0225 058 0597 Fraction of job-to-job transitions
α 0098 0364 0378 21–25 year old finding probability
0334 0345 26–30 year old finding probability
0318 0314 31–35 year old finding probability
0306 0299 36–40 year old finding probability
0290 0288 41–45 year old finding probability
0278 0275 46–50 year old finding probability
0270 0271 51–55 year old finding probability
alternate models are the cases where either experience does not influence worker’s in-
formation about the quality of a new match or where there are no job-to-job transitions.
Simulations help shed light on how each of these mechanisms influences worker flows
over the life cycle.
To simulate the model, the value functions are computed to generate reservation
probabilities for workers at each experience level. Using these decision rules, employ-
ment outcomes are simulated for individual workers. The outcomes for 20,000 simulated
workers are computed from the date that workers enter the labor force, shown as age
18 in the figures. Monthly employment, job finding probabilities, job separation prob-
abilities, wages, tenure, and total experience are recorded. Outcomes from the model
can be compared to the data by assuming that there are a large number of workers fac-
ing identical decision problems. Each worker faces a different history of idiosyncratic
shocks. Hence, aggregate data are constructed from the model by averaging outcomes
across workers and monthly observations to generate average annual outcomes. Sim-
ulated data over a 40-year career are generated to see if they match general patterns
observed in U.S. labor market data.
4.1 Job finding probabilities
First, simulated job finding probabilities by age are shown in Figure 1. The figure plots
average monthly job finding probabilities for each age group targeted in the calibration
(18–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, 36–40, 41–45, 46–50, and 51–55) along with lines that show
average job finding rates by each age from the data. The simulated lines still show some
variation even with 20,000 individual simulations since only a small fraction of individ-
uals are unemployed in any given month. The figure shows that the baseline calibration
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Figure 1. Monthly job finding probabilities by age for the U.S. economy along with simulations
of the baseline calibrated model, the model without experience (α = 0), and the model without
job-to-job transitions (δ= 0). Data are denoted by dots; calibrated models are denoted by lines.
closely matches the decline in job finding probabilities as workers age. In contrast, when
α= 0 the model does not generate any decline in job finding rates with age. The param-
eter α determines how much information past job experience provides about new job
opportunities: α = 0 is analogous to the standard Jovanovic (1979) model where indi-
viduals learn nothing about future jobs and the employment is a pure renewal process.
Higher values of α imply that workers learn faster about future jobs. This can generate
steeper declines in both job finding and separation probabilities as workers can chose to
reject bad jobs before accepting them and reject bad jobs more quickly when employed.
Figure 1 also plots results for the model with no job-to-job transitions when δ = 0.
The ability of workers to transfer directly from one job to another reduces the option
value of unemployment, making even bad jobs more attractive. This implies that work-
ers are willing to accept a larger fraction of jobs, so information will have less of an effect
in reducing job finding probabilities. This can be seen from the fact that the rate of de-
cline in the job finding rate is much steeper for a given value of α when δ = 0. When
interpreting the results it should also be emphasized that even small values of α can
generate substantial declines in job finding rates over the life cycle. While the calibrated
value implies that for every 10 years of work experience nearly 1 year of information
about a new job is generated, even smaller values of information can generate declines
in job finding rates, modifying the implications of standard learning models.
4.2 Job separation probabilities
Next, we consider the model’s predictions about job separation probabilities over the
life cycle. In the data, the job separation probability has a sharp initial decline during the
first three average points from age 18 to 30. To compare the model predictions to the data
it should be noted that job separations can be measured in two ways from the model.
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Figure 2. Monthly job separation probabilities by age for the U.S. economy along with simu-
lations of the baseline calibrated model, the model without experience (α = 0), and the model
without job-to-job transitions (δ = 0). Left panel: job-to-job transitions excluded. Right panel:
all separations. Data are denoted by dots; calibrated models are denoted by lines.
The first measure only looks at separations to unemployment while the second measure
includes both separations to unemployment and those generated by job-to-job transi-
tions. The simulated results are presented in Figure 2. The left panel shows results from
each model for separations directly to unemployment. Recall that the baseline calibra-
tion targets the model to match the data for 51–55 year old workers. This target roughly
corresponds to the rate of exogenous job separations in the model. Endogenous sepa-
rations arise in the model as workers quit when their belief about the quality of their
current match falls below an endogenous threshold. The rate of these separations early
in life will depend on the fraction of jobs that are good, the speed of learning, and the
relative rate of job offers in employment and unemployment. The figure shows that the
baseline model with job-to-job transitions closely matches the target, but does not gen-
erate many increased separations to unemployment early in the worker’s career. This is
because the job offer rate for employed workers is high enough that unemployment is
no longer a very attractive option. Hence, the job separation profile is flat for both the
baseline model and the model when α= 0. In contrast, in the case where δ= 0 and there
are no job-to-job transitions the model generates a modest amount of endogenous sep-
arations to unemployment early in life.
The right panel of Figure 2 shows simulations for each specification of the model
for all separations. The separation rate includes both separations to unemployment and
job-to-job transitions. Including job-to-job transitions implies that both the baseline
model and the model with α= 0 now have declining job separation rates with age. This
is because job-to-job transitions occur at a higher rate early in life as workers sort them-
selves into good jobs. Once a worker is fairly certain that her job is a good match she
is unlikely to receive an outside offer that is better so the rate of job-to-job transitions
declines with age. Note that in the baseline model the decline in job separations contin-
ues for longer as increased learning about the quality of new jobs allows new job offers
Quantitative Economics 7 (2016) Experience and worker flows 241
to improve over the life cycle, while when α = 0 all new jobs have belief p0 so the rate
of separations levels off much sooner. In this case, the model better matches the CPS
data on the job separation probability by age. It is worth noting that the CPS data are
measured as separations to unemployment in each month, but the procedure in Shimer
(2012) imputes the number of unemployment spells lasting less than a month. Hence,
the measure could be capturing some direct job-to-job transitions depending on the
definitions used.
4.3 Wages
Finally, Figure 3 shows the average annual wages by age from each model. All three mod-
els generate rapid wage growth during the first 10 years of experience and then level off.
The amount of wage growth generated by the models is arbitrary from the normalization
of the levels of μh and μl in the parameterization. It is worth noting that α plays an im-
portant role in continued increases in wages after the first 10 years or the worker’s career.
In the model with α= 0 wages level off as workers do not learn about future prospective
matches, while when α > 0 wages continue to rise throughout the life cycle as workers
select into better and better matches if they ever become unemployed.
While the models match the general pattern of wage growth, they can generate an
arbitrary amount of wage growth over the life cycle. These patterns are qualitatively
consistent with the behavior of wages over the life cycle. Flinn (1986) argues that wage
growth and turnover are related for young workers. The model presents a theory that ac-
counts for both phenomena. In particular, Topel and Ward (1992) document a number
of features of wage profiles during a worker’s first 10 years of experience. They document
that the first 10 years of the career account for two-thirds of lifetime wage growth. Job
changes explain about one-third of wage growth. Moreover, wages on the job approxi-
mate a random walk.
Figure 3. Wages by age in the baseline calibrated model, the model without experience (α= 0),
and the model without job-to-job transitions (δ= 0).
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5. Wage volatility
This section quantitatively evaluates the model’s predictions on wage volatility using
data on wages and job changes from the NLSY79. The novel feature of the model is that
workers who start jobs with more experience have better information about the quality
of their new job. This information means that on average workers with more experience
start with a higher p. Therefore, when starting a new job, the change in wages over the
first year would display less volatility than a worker starting out with less experience.11
These predictions are documented using observations simulated from the model. More-
over, as evidence that the learning mechanism proposed is important for workers, the
same results are documented using data from the NLSY79. As robustness, the implica-
tions of the model with no learning across jobs (α = 0) and no job-to-job transitions
(δ = 0) are also explored. The model with α = 0 does not generate any decline in wage
volatility with experience even with job-to-job transitions while the results are robust in
the model with δ = 0. This implies that selection into better matches generated by job-
to-job transitions alone cannot generate the decline in wage volatility with experience
observed in the data.
The results contrast with the well known fact that the cross-sectional variation in
residual wages increases as workers age as discussed in Kahn and Lange (2013) among
others. While pay distributions fan out with experience in the cross section, the model
in this paper predicts that the unanticipated changes in individual wages within a given
job shrink with experience. Therefore, individuals are more certain about their future
wages as their careers progress. While the effect of experience on wages has been ex-
plored by a large theoretical literature (see Neal and Rosen (2000), Gibbons et al. (2005)),
previous work has not explored the impact of experience on individuals’ within job wage
volatility. Understanding the features of the individual income process is important to
explain a wide array of individual behavior (see Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)).
5.1 Data and measurement of wage volatility
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative longitudinal survey conducted by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics that samples 12,686 individuals who were between the ages of 14 and
22 years old when first surveyed in 1979. The NLSY79 provides a rich set of panel data for
tracking workers’ career outcomes. Individuals were surveyed every year until 1994 and
every 2 years thereafter. The sample is restricted to the 1979–1994 period for the analysis
as yearly differences in wages are needed to construct measures of wage volatility within
jobs.
Key variables used in the analysis are worker experience and wage volatility on new
jobs. Experience is constructed by taking a cumulative sum of the weeks worked in the
11As shown in the Appendix, a worker with more experience and hence more information about their
quality of the match will experience lower wage volatility in the case where p¯(τ) > 05 and is increasing
in τ. The mechanism then is that workers who start with a higher belief p will have smaller changes in
future wages on a job because p is also a sufficient statistic for the variance of the worker’s belief. The same
result would hold more generally for the case where the productivity of jobs were drawn from a normal
distribution rather than being of just two types.
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past year variable. This number is divided by 52 to create years of experience. To avoid
miscalculation of past experience, the sample is limited to workers who are 17 years old
or younger at the time of the first interview so that all experience after finishing high
school is counted. For the initial job, the greater value of weeks worked during the past
year and the tenure on that job are used. This variable provides a measure of the worker’s
cumulative experience and can be used as a measure of how much actual (rather than
potential) experience the worker has in any given year when starting a new job.
Wage volatility is measured as the unanticipated change in workers’ wages during
their first year on a new job. To construct job variables the data are broken into job ob-
servations using NLSY79 data on the total number of past jobs that the respondent has
held. The NLSY79 defines a job as a relationship between an individual employer and
the worker so that changes in position within a firm are not considered new jobs. A new
job observation is created if the total number of jobs in year t is greater than in year t−1.
For each job observation the wage in each year is given by the CPS wage variable.12 Wage
observations in the top and bottom 1% are dropped to correct for misreporting in the
wage data and to make sure that outliers are not driving the results. The final data set
includes 10,246 job observations.
Each worker’s employment history is broken into jobs that are characterized by a
wage for each year of tenure on the job and the initial experience level when starting the
job. To do this the job number variable from the NLSY79 is used that counts only new
jobs, excluding recalls to the same employer. To look at an individual’s wage volatility on
a particular job we focus on wage changes during the first year on that job. Therefore,
jobs with fewer than two annual wage observations are dropped from the sample. Wage
volatility is measured as the absolute deviation from the worker’s expected wage growth
path. The wage volatility measure used is
v = ∣∣log(w1)− log(w0)−we∣∣
where v is the volatility of wages on a given job. The variable wt is the wage observed at
tenure t, so the measure computes the log difference between the wage after 1 year and
the initial wage. Finally, since wages grow with experience and also grow more rapidly
early in a worker’s career, the expected log wage growth for the worker’s level of expe-
rience when starting the job, we, is subtracted from the observed wage change. The
experience level we is measured as the predicted value of the log wage change esti-
mated from a quintic polynomial of annual experience. Taking the absolute value of this
difference provides the magnitude of the difference in wages from the expected wage
path after 1 year on a particular job. This maps directly into the predictions of the model
that higher experience should result in smaller changes in the worker’s belief p and wage
w(p).
12Since wages are only recorded each year it is possible that the wages could have already changed from
the initial wage at the time of first observation. Despite this measurement issue, the same issue arises when
annual data are taken from the simulated model. In the simulated model workers’ wages change every
month based on their updated beliefs. Treating the simulated data the same as the NLSY79 observations
should yield similar biases.
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A nice feature of this measure is that looking at only individual wage differences ab-
stracts from a number of issues that arise when using cross-sectional wage variation.
Higher volatility implies that a given individual experiences larger changes in her wages
on a given job. By subtracting we the measure of volatility used in this paper controls
for expected wage gains in each year of tenure at a particular job and level of experience.
While most workers get wage increases from year to year, subtracting the expected wage
growth means that many workers are both above and below the expectation.
To compare observed outcomes from the NLSY79 with the model, 25 years of annual
observations from the model are simulated for the worker’s employment status, past
experience, accumulated job number, and wage.
5.2 Results
The novel prediction of the model is that wage volatility declines with job experience.
To explore this prediction, measured volatility for each job is plotted by previous expe-
rience. The left panel of Figure 4 shows the scatter plot for the calibrated model. The
model generates a decline in wage volatility for workers with more past work experi-
ence. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the median wage volatility by
experience for the NLSY79 data. Just as in the simulation the data show a decline in wage
volatility for workers with more past experience. The patterns of volatility with experi-
ence are consistent with those predicted by the model. Note that there is a difference in
scale between the model and the data with a higher average level of wage volatility in
the data. Since the magnitudes of wage volatility are higher in the data, the model does
not capture all of the observed volatility. However, ignoring the differences in levels, the
model and data have a similar rate of decline in volatility over the first 15 years of work
experience.
Figure 5 presents plots of wage volatility with experience for the other two specifi-
cations of the model. The left panel shows the case where α = 0. In this case the figure
suggests that there is no decline in wage volatility with experience. The right panel plots
the case of δ = 0. Here the figure shows some decline, but the magnitude appears to be
smaller than the baseline model.
Figure 4. Wage volatility (v) by years of past experience. Baseline simulated model in the left
panel; NLSY79 data in the right panel.
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Figure 5. Wage volatility (v) by years of past experience: simulated model without experience
(α= 0) in the left panel and without job-to-job transitions (δ= 0) in the right panel.
Table 2. Regression results of wage volatility on years of experience for simulated data from
each of the three model specifications.
Wage Volatility
Variable Baseline α= 0 δ= 0
Experience −00037∗∗∗ −00039∗∗∗ 00001 −00001 −00032∗∗∗ 00032∗∗∗
(00001) (00001) (00001) (00001) (00001) (00001)
Intercept 01143∗∗∗ 01154∗∗∗ 01160∗∗∗ 01169∗∗∗ 01126∗∗∗ 01130∗∗∗
(00007) (00006) (00007) (00007) (00006) (00005)
Fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 66,538 66,538 62,289 62,289 61,766 61,766
Note: Standard errors clustered by individual in OLS specifications. ∗∗∗p< 001; ∗∗p< 005; ∗p< 01.
Next, the model predictions about the decline in wage volatility with experience are
empirically evaluated. Table 2 shows the results of regressions of wage volatility on years
of experience for simulated data from each of the three models. For each model, results
are shown for a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and an empirical spec-
ification with fixed effects to show that the patterns hold at the individual level. The first
two columns of the table report results from the baseline model. The results imply that
an additional year of experience reduces wage volatility by about 37 basis points. The
final four columns present the results for the model with no learning from experience
(α= 0) and no job-to-job transitions (δ= 0). When α= 0 and workers do not learn any-
thing from past work experience, the model does not generate any reduction in wage
volatility with experience. Both the OLS and fixed effects specifications generate precise
zero estimates of the coefficient on experience. This is the case because for any new job
that a worker starts she has the same belief about its quality, p0. Therefore, even with
job-to-job transitions there is no reduction in wage volatility on new jobs. However, in
the specification with no job-to-job transitions there is still a strongly negative effect
of experience on wage volatility. The effect is slightly smaller than the baseline model,
demonstrating that job-to-job transitions can amplify the effects from the model. This
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Table 3. Regression results of wage volatility on years of experience for NLSY79 data with con-
trols.
Variable Wage Volatility
Experience −00048∗∗∗ −00048∗∗∗ −00068∗∗∗ −00038∗∗∗
(00008) (00008) (00014) (00010)
Intercept 02189∗∗∗ 02248∗∗∗ 01960∗∗∗ 02145∗∗∗
(00044) (00121) (00196) (00049)
Individual controls No Yes Yes NA
Age and time dummies No No Yes NA
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 10,246 10,246 10,246 10,246
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by individual in OLS specifications. ∗∗∗p< 001; ∗∗p< 005; ∗p< 01.
occurs for two reasons. First, when workers learn, job-to-job transitions allow workers
to move from their current match to an even better match. This combination of learn-
ing is strengthened by the restriction that workers will only choose to switch if they are
more certain that the new job is good. Second, as shown in the results the model with
δ= 0 generates an even more rapid decline in job finding rates with age because unem-
ployment is the only route to find a new job. This reduction in job finding probabilities
corresponds with increasing pickiness with regard to which jobs to accept as the indi-
vidual cannot switch jobs when employed, enhancing the effect of learning.
Finally, Table 3 empirically evaluates the relationship between wage volatility and
experience in the NLSY data. The first column of the table shows the raw regression of
wage volatility on work experience and finds a significant negative coefficient of simi-
lar magnitude found in the model with job-to-job transitions with a 1 year increase in
experience corresponding to a 48 basis point reduction in wage volatility. The next two
columns add individual controls and age and time dummies to the regression. The in-
dividual controls include gender, education, and race dummies. The inclusion of addi-
tional controls does not change the main estimate. Most of the dummies are insignifi-
cant with the exception that females have significantly lower wage volatility than males.
The education dummies are important as the impact of experience on individual wage
volatility remains the same even though different education groups are known to have
different wage experience profiles.13 The third column includes age and time dummies
to control for the possibility that the year that individuals entered the labor market or
other cyclical factors could influence the outcomes. With these additional controls the
relationship between experience and wage volatility becomes stronger with an addi-
tional year of experience corresponding to a 68 basis point reduction in wage volatility.
Finally, the fourth column shows the specification with fixed effects to document that
the predicted pattern from the model holds within individual observations. In this spec-
ification, an additional year of experience corresponds to a 38 basis point reduction in
wage volatility that is significant at the 1% level.
13See for instance Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Lange (2007) for a more recent discussion.
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The results in this section confirm a robust negative relationship between past work
experience and observed wage volatility in the first year of a new job. This relationship
is surprising in light of the well known fact that cross-sectional wage variation increases
with worker’s experience. The cross-sectional variation of residual wages is measured
across workers, which contrasts with the measure of wage volatility of workers in this
paper measured as individual wage changes on a particular job. Such a cross-sectional
increase in the dispersion of wages is generated by learning models because beliefs be-
come more diffuse as workers learn about the quality of their jobs. However, the results
in this paper suggest that even though differences in wages across workers grow, expe-
rience allows workers to better predict how their own wages will evolve. Hence, cross-
sectional wage variation may not be a good measure of the uncertainty that individual
workers face about their wages.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of learning that can explain changes in workers’ job finding
probabilities over their life cycle. Workers’ learning about the quality of their match is
important for both observed outcomes while employed, such as wages and employment
durations, and outcomes while unemployed. This insight motivates the model where
experience gives workers both knowledge about the quality of their current job and the
ability to distinguish between good and bad job offers.
A model with learning about both the quality of the current match and future
matches has rich implications for labor market outcomes. It is consistent with the age
profiles of unemployment, job finding probabilities, job separation probabilities, hazard
rates of separation with tenure, wage dispersion, and wage growth. The model is used to
generate new predictions about workers’ wage volatility on jobs based on their experi-
ence. The prediction of lower volatility with more past experience holds in the NLSY79
data. While job-to-job transitions enhance the reduction in wage volatility generated by
the model, the model cannot generate any decline in volatility without learning about
the quality of new matches from experience. Finally, the fact that past experience has
an impact on wage levels and volatility on new jobs has implications for how to identify
returns to experience.
Appendix: Model characterization
This section seeks to characterize the model by making additional assumptions about
the value of information. To simplify the analysis consider a simplified model with no
job-to-job transitions. Let V (pτ) be the value function for an employed worker with
belief p and experience τ. The value function is written as
V (pτ) = w(p)+βsU(τ + 1)
+β(1− s)
∫ 1
0
max
{
U(τ + 1)V (p′ τ + 1)}G(dp′|p)
The unemployed value function remains the same.
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So as to characterize how additional experience influences the optimal reservation
value, define the notation
m(y)≡m(y + 1)−m(y)
for any function m(y). For functions of more than one variable,  will always denote
changes in experience, τ.
By making assumptions about the value of information, the sign of p¯(τ) can be
determined. The reservation productivity level will be increasing in experience if the
marginal value of information while employed at the reservation belief is less than the
marginal value of information when unemployed, that is, when U(τ + 1) ≤ U(τ).
Without job-to-job transitions, extra experience only impacts a worker when she be-
comes unemployed and seeks a new job. Similar results can be obtained in the full model
with additional work to consider changes in the value of information for job offers re-
ceived while employed. This condition can be interpreted as requiring the marginal
value of experience for unmatched workers to be decreasing in τ. Another way to un-
derstand the result is that the direct benefit from the additional unit of experience has
to be greater than the option value of the unit of experience for getting more experience
later in life. Moscarini and Smith (2002) provide evidence that this is not a very restric-
tive assumption by showing that the value of information is asymptotically decreasing
in the number of signals.
This intuition is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If U(τ + 1)≤ U(τ), then p¯(τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ {01    T }.
Proof. Differencing (3) with respect to τ gives
p¯(τ)Vp
(
p¯(τ) τ
)+V (p¯(τ) τ)= U(τ)
p¯(τ)= U(τ)−V
(
p¯(τ) τ
)
Vp
(
p¯(τ) τ
) 
Then p¯(τ) > 0 if V (p¯(τ) τ)≤ U(τ). It suffices to show that V (pτ)≤ U(τ+ 1) for
all τ ∈ {01    T } and p ∈ [01]. We will proceed by backward induction starting from
τ = T . For τ = T ,
V (pT)= U(T + 1)= U(T)= 0
For T − 1,
V (pT − 1) = [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T)|p)]U(T)
+β(1− s)
∫ 1
p¯(T )
V
(
p′T
)
G
(
dp′|p)
= 0= U(T)
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For T − 2,
V (pT − 2) = [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T − 1)|p)]U(T − 1)
+β(1− s)
∫ 1
p¯(T−1)
V
(
p′T − 1)G(dp′|p)
= [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T − 1)|p)]U(T − 1)
= β[s + (1− s)G(p¯(T − 1)|p)]U(T − 1) < U(T − 1)
Finally, assuming V (pT − n)≤ U(T − n+ 1), we can solve for T − n− 1:
V (pT − n− 1) = [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T − n)|p)]U(T − n)
+β(1− s)
∫ 1
p¯(T−n)
V
(
p′T − n)G(dp′|p)
≤ [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T)|p)]U(T − n)
+β(1− s)(1−G(p¯(T − n)|p))U(T − n+ 1)
≤ [βs +β(1− s)G(p¯(T)|p)]U(T − n)
+β(1− s)(1−G(p¯(T − n)|p))U(T − n)
= U(T − n)
The first inequality comes from the induction and the second comes from the hypothe-
sis that U(τ + 1)≤ U(τ) for all τ ∈ {01    T }. 
Although, Proposition 1 does not characterize the sign of p¯(τ) in terms of model
parameters, it provides clear intuition for when the reservation belief will be increasing
in experience.
Using the results on the worker’s reservation decision above, it is useful to consider
the behavior of the job finding rate as a function of experience, f (τ). The job finding rate
is determined by the exogenous rate of matches combined with the workers willingness
to accept production opportunities:
f (τ)= λ(1−H(p¯(τ)|τ))
Proposition 2. If U(τ + 1)≤ U(τ) and p¯(τ)≤ p0, then f(τ) < 0.
Proof. Taking the derivative of f (τ) with respect to τ gives
f(τ)= −λh(p¯(τ)|τ)p¯(τ)− λH(p¯(τ)|τ)
where h(p¯(τ)|τ) is the p.d.f. of H. By Proposition 1, U(τ + 1) ≤ U(τ) implies
that p¯(τ) > 0. This condition guarantees that the first term is negative. The second
term is also negative when p¯(τ) ≤ p0 because H(p|τ) is a mean preserving spread
around p0. 
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The conditions in Proposition 2 generate declining job finding probabilities early in
workers lives where p¯(τ) ≤ p0 as workers accept most jobs to gain experience.14 There
are three effects that change the job finding rate in the model. First, more information
shifts the distribution of possible jobs. When higher values of τ produce a mean preserv-
ing spread on H(p¯(τ)|τ), the direction of the effect depends on whether p¯(τ) is greater
than or less than p0. For p¯(τ) < p0 more information shifts more of the mass of the
distribution below p¯(τ). Second, the worker’s optimal choice shifts in response to the
known distribution. Under assumptions about the value of information, more informa-
tion shifts p¯(τ) upward. Finally, the value of information drives a wedge between the
value of employment and the value of unemployment as workers only gain experience
when employed. This can increase or decrease p¯(τ), depending on the marginal value
of an additional unit of experience. While generating a decline in job finding probabili-
ties does not provide a test of the model, the strength of the model is that it generates a
theory about when job finding probabilities will be increasing or decreasing. Job finding
probabilities are likely to decline early in workers careers when additional information
has diminishing returns.
The final implications of the model involve the process of the worker’s current belief
p while employed. Given the binary structure of productive opportunities in the model,
the density of output ψ(x|p) is a mixture density of two normal distributions with means
μh and μl and weights of p and (1− p). The properties of the mixture density are char-
acterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The distribution characterized by the mixture density ψ(x|p) has mean
μmix = pμn + (1 − p)μl and variance σ2mix = p(1 − p)(μh − μl)2 + σ2 where σ2 is the
variance of each of the two distributions in the mixture.
Proof. The density ψ(x|p) is the mixture of two normal distributions with means μh
and μl and the same variance σ2. Letting wi denote the weights in each distribution, we
have that the mean of the mixture distribution μmix is given by
μmix =
∑
i∈{hl}
wiμi = pμh + (1−p)μl
The variance σ2mix is given by
σ2mix =
∑
i∈{hl}
[
wi
(
μ2i + σ2
)]−μ2mix
= p(μ2h + σ2)+ (1−p)(μ2l + σ2)− (pμh + (1−p)μl)2
= p(1−p)μ2h + (1−p)
(
1− (1−p))μ2l − 2p(1−p)μhμl + σ2
= p(1−p)(μh −μl)2 + σ2 
14The focus of this paper is to model the initial decline in job finding probabilities for young workers. In
certain parameterizations, job finding probabilities can be increasing later in life when p¯(τ) > p0; however
for most parameter values the increase in job finding probabilities occurs after longer horizons than the
typical length of a worker’s career.
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The standard deviation of expected output depends on both the standard deviation
of the output process σ2 and the uncertainty about the worker’s job type. While the
noise from the output process is constant the uncertainty depends on the current be-
lief p. This implies that the standard deviation of expected output peaks at p = 05 and
decreases as p converges to 0 or 1. While the model does not provide a closed form solu-
tion for the standard deviation of G(p′|p), the above intuition shows that it is decreasing
in p if p> 05.
This result is important to understand how workers learn. Unlike in Jovanovic (1979)
the standard deviation of output does not decrease monotonically as the worker learns
more. Instead, the standard deviation depends on the current value of p and will on
average decrease for workers as their current belief converges to either 0 or 1.15
Next, the expected initial belief based on initial experience τ is characterized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. If τ˜ > τ, p¯(τ)≤ p¯(τ˜), and p¯(τ)≤ p0, then the expected value of the ini-
tial beliefs for an accepted offer is higher for the worker with more experience. That is,
E
[
H(p|τ)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ)]≤E[H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ˜)]
Proof. First, note that since τ˜ > τ, H(p|τ˜) is a mean preserving spread of H(p|τ). By
definition of a mean preserving spread we have∫ x
0
H(p|τ)dp≤
∫ x
0
H(p|τ˜) dp
for any value of x ∈ (01]. Note that the lower bound on the integrals is 0 as the support
of the distribution H is from 0 to 1. Integrating the above equation by parts on each side
gives
xH(x|τ)−
∫ x
0
ph(p|τ)dp≤ xH(x|τ˜)−
∫ x
0
ph(p|τ˜) dp
Subtracting the bound x from each side and adding the mean of the distribution H, p0,
to each side of the equation gives
xH(x|τ)− x+p0 −
∫ x
0
ph(p|τ)dp≤ xH(x|τ˜)− x+p0 −
∫ x
0
ph(p|τ˜) dp
−x[1−H(x|τ)]+ ∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ)dp≤ −x[1−H(x|τ˜)]+ ∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ˜) dp
Factoring and simplifying each side gives
[
1−H(x|τ)]
[∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ)dp
1−H(x|τ) − x
]
≤ [1−H(x|τ˜)]
[∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ˜) dp
1−H(x|τ˜) − x
]

15If the job types are drawn from a normal distribution instead of one with two types, the variance of
beliefs about the worker’s type would decrease monotonically in information.
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∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ)dp
1−H(x|τ) ≤
1−H(x|τ˜)
1−H(x|τ)
[∫ 1
x
ph(p|τ˜) dp
1−H(x|τ˜) − x
]
+ x
E
[
H(p|τ)∣∣p≥ x]≤ 1−H(x|τ˜)
1−H(x|τ)
[
E
[
H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ x]− x]+ x
The above equation holds for any x ∈ (01]. Now if x= p¯(τ) we have
E
[
H(p|τ)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ)] ≤ 1−H
(
p¯(τ)|τ˜)
1−H(p¯(τ)|τ)
[
E
[
H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ)]− p¯(τ)]+ p¯(τ)
≤ [E[H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ)]− p¯(τ)]+ p¯(τ)
≤ E[H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ)]
≤ E[H(p|τ˜)∣∣p≥ p¯(τ˜)]
The second inequality follows from p¯(τ) ≤ p0 and the definition of a mean preserving
spread; the fourth inequality comes from p¯(τ)≤ p¯(τ˜). 
Given the wage process, the behavior of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 can be used
to make predictions about volatility of wages on new jobs. A worker with more experi-
ence who starts a new match will have more information about the quality of that match
than a worker with less experience. In the case where p¯(τ) > 05 and is increasing in τ,
the model predicts that more experience translates, on average, to a higher value of p at
the start of a new job and hence smaller changes in future wages. These implications are
quantitatively evaluated with simulations of the model.
While the above propositions deal with the specific learning mechanism in this pa-
per with two types of jobs, the mechanism is more general. In particular, any setup where
the variance of beliefs is declining in experience should generate declining wage volatil-
ity on new jobs based on the amount of past experience that the worker has. Also, in
the model with two types of jobs, job-to-job transitions should strengthen the result as
workers will only accept jobs that they believe to be better than their current one and
this means that they are more certain of their type. Generally, with more than two types
of jobs the variance of the belief can be separated from the level of the current belief
potentially breaking this connection.
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